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We develop a theoretical framework that allows determining a wide range of 
infrastructure effects both in the short and long run. While the ones in the short run 
have already been analyzed, we derive the elasticities concerning the long run by 
allowing adjustments in the quasi-fixed inputs towards their optimum levels. By 
considering the impact of infrastructure on private investment decisions, it is 
observed how, apart from the direct effect on costs in the short run, infrastructures 
present an indirect channel of influence (in the long run) through its effect on 
private capital. The model is applied to the manufactures in the Spanish regions. 
 
Keywords: Public Infrastructure, Long-run vs. Short-run Equilibrium, 
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En el presente artículo se desarrolla un marco teórico que permite determinar un 
amplio rango de efectos de las infraestructuras, tanto en el corto como en el 
largo plazo. Mientras que los efectos en el corto plazo han sido analizados en 
otros trabajos, aquí se derivan las elasticidades referentes al largo plazo 
permitiendo ajustes en los inputs cuasi-fijos hacia sus niveles de equilibrio. A 
través de la consideración del impacto de las infraestructuras en las decisiones 
de inversión privadas, se observa cómo además del efecto directo en los costes 
en el corto plazo, las infraestructuras presentan un canal indirecto de influencia 
(en el largo plazo) a través de sus efectos en el capital privado. El modelo se 
aplica al caso de la industria manufacturera de las regiones españolas.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Most studies analyzing public capital impact on output and productivity 
have used neoclassical production functions (Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1992; 
Garcia-Milà and McGuire, 1992 among others). Their results generally support a 
positive effect of public capital, but the range of results is too large to be 
conclusive and many deficiencies have been signaled thereafter. The production 
function has been considered inaccurate due to the restrictions imposed on the 
technology and the firms’ behavior as well as for not taking into account private 
input prices that would affect the intensity in which they are used. In order to 
overcome part of these problematic issues the use of the duality theory has been 
suggested. The duality theory through the estimation of cost and profit functions 
allows us to examine the complementary or substitutability relationship between 
private and public factors as well as the marginal effect of infrastructure on the 
firms cost structure. 
The present paper follows the line of research based on the duality theory 
with the main purpose of enabling a better understanding of the linkage between 
the publicly provided input and the nature of  the manufacturing production 
process. The methodology considered is a cost function that allows us to 
disentangle the total effect of public capital into the different effects on the 
various private factors. Among the studies that have used cost functions 
aggregated with public capital we can point out those from Berndt and Hansson 
(1992) for the Swedish case, Nadiri and Mamuneas (1994) and Morrison and 
Schwartz (1996) for the US, Conrad and Seitz (1992) and Seitz and Licht (1995) 
for the German economy, Sturm (1997) for the Netherlands, and Moreno et al. 
(1997a), Avilés et al. (1997) and Boscá et al. (1998) for Spain. 
However, this paper extends these approaches to the consideration of the 
effect of infrastructure on private capital location. Taking this effect into 
account, we will distinguish two different effects of public infrastructure on 
costs. First, a direct channel affecting variable costs. Second, an indirect one   3 
coming from changes in private capital intensities. Former papers using cost 
functions have only considered the direct effect of public capital, with the 
exception of Morrison and Schwartz (1996) who consider a long run effect 
through an indirect channel due to output adjustments. However, in the present 
paper we are able to measure the long run effects of infrastructure through 
private capital adjustments, since this quasi-fixed input is allowed to adjust in 
the long run in response to changes in public capital. This long run cost effect 
through altering capital intensities has been considered in Nadiri and Kim 
(1996) and Bernstein and Yan (1997) in order to estimate the effects of R&D 
spillovers on the cost and production structure. Nevertheless, as far as we know, 
it has not been used when computing public infrastructure effects on production 
costs. 
In our opinion, this latter point is especially important for the study of the 
impact of infrastructure investments. An improvement in the endowment of 
public capital may have two effects. It increases profitability of the production 
process in the existing firms and, as a consequence, it makes more attractive the 
location of new economic activities. Thus, we define a short run effect 
experienced by firms that are already producing, and this is due to cost 
reductions in variable inputs as a consequence of the new public capital stock. 
Further, we define a long run effect by which higher profitability promotes new 
investments in private capital, increasing the size of the existing firms or 
allowing more firms to operate in the economy. This may not only change the 
spatial distribution of activity, as pointed out by Martin and Rogers (1995), but 
may also provoke sectoral restructuring in the economy in line with the 
theoretical ideas in Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996).  
When analyzing public capital effect using the duality theory one may use 
either a total cost function or a variable cost function. In the former case, one is 
assuming that all factors of production can be costlessly adjusted so that firms 
instantaneously determine long run factor demands. In this case, the long run   4 
effect of public capital through changes in private capital stock would not be 
distinguishable. However, in the latter case, it is considered that adjustment 
costs beyond the control of firms do not allow inputs to adjust instantaneously to 
their long run equilibrium levels. Rather than assuming these ideas a priori, in 
the present paper we use the test developed by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) 
to acknowledge into the possible divergence of private capital from its static 
equilibrium values. This way, the most appropriate cost model according to the 
analyzed economy can be taken into consideration.  
Finally, empirical models studying the impact of infrastructure on growth 
suffer from strong multicollinearity. As stated in Chunrong and Cassou (1997) 
this may cause misleading conclusions on the significance and size of the effect. 
The problem is exacerbated when applying the duality theory because of the use 
of very general functions (such as the translog) which include a large number of 
parameters. In order to avoid this problem, we increase the cross-section 
variability by descending to both a regional and sectoral level. This way, we also 
yield additional insights about the variability of public capital effects across 
economic s ectors and regions. In fact, Seitz and Licht (1995) claim that their 
results obtained from the estimation of a cost function in the regional German 
case could be affected by the great differences existing in the sectoral structure 
of manufacturing industry across the federal states in Germany. In accordance to 
these ideas, the present paper takes into consideration both a sectoral and 
regional disaggregation in the Spanish case during the eighties to implement the 
model. 
The paper is outlined as follows. In the second section the model based on 
the duality theory assuming that firms do not instantaneously adjust their capital 
stock to their optimal level is presented. The expressions for public capital 
elasticities both in the short and long run are derived  as well. Section third 
describes an empirical model following a translog specification and the main 
econometric issues in order to apply it. The database used to implement the   5 
model and the empirical results for the manufactures in the Spanish regions are 
subsequently presented and discussed in section 4. Finally, some concluding 
remarks and suggestions for further research are given in section 5. 
 
2. FIRM BEHAVIOR MODEL WITH PUBLIC CAPITAL  
Short and Long Run Cost Functions 
A cost function is a mathematical representation of the cost-minimizing 
problem faced by firms. In this framework, it is possible to explicitly include 
public capital in order to take into account the cost effect of this kind of external 
factor. 
Let’s consider a production function, where  Y is the output and  Xi 
(i=1,...,r) the i-th input: 
) ,..., , ( 2 1 r X X X f Y ?   (1) 
It is assumed that the firm is constrained to accept a vector of input prices, 
P1,...,Pr, so that the optimization problem firms face implies deciding the amount 
of inputs that minimizes the cost of producing a given output,Y . Then, we can 
obtain a group of demand functions for private inputs:  
) , ,..., ( 1 Y P P f X r i i ?   (2) 
Being  Xi
*  the optimal amount of input, the level of optimum cost, that is, the 
solution to t he optimization problem yields a cost function that is dual to the 
production function, being dependent on input prices and output: 
) , ,..., ( ) , ( 1
* * Y P P f X P Y P C r i i i i ? ? ? ?   (3) 
where * denotes values at the equilibrium. A detailed description of cost 
function properties can be found in Chambers (1988). 
In such a framework, we are assuming that all factors of production can 
be costlessly adjusted so that the firm instantaneously determines long run factor 
demands. This is the static equilibrium hypothesis for production factors. 
Nevertheless, rather than assuming that all inputs adjust instantaneously to their   6 
long run equilibrium values, there are reasons to believe in the absence of such 
an adjustment mechanism for some factors. We can think of costs of investment 
and disinvestment, price controls and regulations, credit rationing, and 
institutional constraints that are out of the control of an individual firm in the 
short run. This is the partial static equilibrium situation. The inputs that are in 
static equilibrium are referred to as variable inputs, and the remaining ones are 
designated as fixed or quasi-fixed inputs. Basing on these ideas, we adopt a 
framework that distinguishes variable from quasi-fixed inputs, where the latter 
adjust only partially to their full equilibrium levels within one time period. 
Therefore, we consider short run cost functions apart from long run cost 
functions. In the former ones, the presence of some inputs fixed at values other 
than their full equilibrium level implies that there are adjustment cost associated 
with changing their quantities. In this case, the goal of the firm is to minimize 
the cost of variable factors conditional on a given stock of quasi-fixed factors. In 
the latter, all inputs are at their full equilibrium values in any period.
1  
Since the purpose of the paper is to obtain public capital elasticities, we 
focus on a production function aggregated with public capital as an unpaid 
factor. This aspect must be taken into account when obtaining the corresponding 
cost function. This way, the variable cost function we are using includes public 
capital as a fixed input: 
) , , , , (
_ _
Kg Kp Y P P VC VC M L ?  
(4) 
where we consider two variable private inputs, labor (L) and intermediates (M) 
which appear in the cost function through their prices, PL, and PM respectively; 




Y  is output and Kg is public capital 
                                                                 
1 Partial static equilibrium and full static equilibrium are o ften referred to as long-run and 
short-run equilibrium, respectively.  In such a case, it is assumed that movements from partial 
equilibrium to full equilibrium need input adjustments that take place with the passage of 
time.  In the present paper we use both denominations although we will rather use the 
distinction between short and long run.   7 
(external input). Public infrastructure is therefore considered as an unpaid fixed 
input in the production process, on w hich firms have little or null control. 
Therefore, this cost function permits the combination of internal scale 
economies in the production process due to private inputs (both variable and 
quasi-fixed) and external scale economies, if existing, provided by the public 
input. That is, scale economies in a cost function are now outlined including this 
new argument, so that publicly provided infrastructures could affect the shape of 
the average cost curve. 
The total short-run cost function is the sum of the variable cost and the 
cost of the existing private capital: 
_
Kp P VC SC Kp ? ?  
(5) 
As regards these specifications, after increasing or improving public capital 
endowment, firms adjust the decisions on the amounts of the different variable 
private inputs used in the production process according to their substitutive or 
complementary relationship with infrastructures, given the existing amount of 
quasi-fixed inputs. This is the short run effect of infrastructure investments in 
the production process. However, in a longer run firms decide the optimal 
amount of physical capital for the new endowment of public capital as well. 
Then, in the long run investments in infrastructure may have an additional effect 
through changes in the decisions of private capital location and the possible 
consequent cost variation effect of private capital. 
Assuming that variable input prices are exogenous to the producer, and 
applying Shephard’s Lemma, it is possible to obtain the unique vector of the 
different variable inputs that minimize costs (cost-minimizing demands): 
) , , , , (
_ _









Furthermore, we can calculate each factor share (Zi), that is, the percentage of 
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Equation set (4) and (7) constitutes the solution to what can be defined as the 
short run equilibrium related to variable factors, constrained to fixed values for 
Y, Kp and Kg.
2 That is, the preceding functions, and consequently the short run 
solution, are not independent of the quasi-fixed factors. From these functions we 
can obtain the required short run elasticities for fixed and quasi-fixed inputs. 
On the other hand, the long-run demand for quasi-fixed factors, Kp
* in our 
case, is given by the envelope conditions. Minimizing total short run cost f or 
Kp: 











? ? ?  
(8) 
This means that the demand for  Kp depends on prices of variable inputs, the 
fixed quantities of output and public capital, and its own price. Let 
) , , , , (
_
* Kg Y P P P g Kp Kp M L ?  
(9) 
be the solution to (8). Substituting (9) into (5), we get the long run cost function: 
) , , , , (
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Thus, equations (4), (6) --or (7)-- and (9) characterize the long-run equilibrium. 
Long run elasticities will be obtained based on them. From (10) it is worth 
noting that Kg may affect long run cost in different ways: by a direct channel 
affecting variable cost, and by an indirect channel through its effect on Kp. The 
latter will include an extra effect on variable cost, by the 
                                                                 
2 The use of demand functions or factor share functions is equally correct.  So, alternatively, 
we could talk about the set (4) and (6).   9 
complementarity/substitutability relationship between private capital and 
variable inputs, and the direct effect of  Kp on costs. These effects through 
changes on private capital will only appear in the long run solution, being the 
main difference between short and long run elasticities. 
 
Short and Long Run Elasticities 
From the functions previously described it is possible to assess the impact 
of public and private capital investments on costs, output, variable input 
demands and returns to scale. Both, the elasticities of public and private capital 
in the short and long run are presented. The change in short run costs due to a 
marginal addition to the infrastructure stock is the short run cost elasticity with 
respect to Kg: 
























where superscript SR denotes short run. Though not specified during all the 
analysis, the output is always supposed to be fixed, so that all the elasticities are 
computed considering a fixed amount of Y (
_
Y ). 
Hence, it is possible to obtain measures of the short run implicit willingness 
of private manufactures to pay for public capital, which is known as (short run) 
infrastructure shadow price. It is defined as the reductions in variable costs due to 
an increase in the public capital stock. As long as this value is positive, firms 
benefit from having additional infrastructures, since they permit obtaining 
variable cost savings.
3 Short run infrastructure shadow price may be specified as 
follows: 
                                                                 
3 In this framework we are considering that firms do not pay for public capital, since it is 
supposed to be an exogenous input.  Nevertheless, even though firms do not face the direct 
costs of accumulating this input, firms do pay for infrastructure in terms of taxes, so that there 
would  exist a social cost to get an adequate public capital endowment. From this perspective, 
the shadow price obtained through this theoretical model will exaggerate the social impact of 







































This measure will be positive as long as public capital supposes benefits in terms 
of substitution relationships with variable inputs, in other words, as long as public 
infrastructure represents efficiency changes in terms of decreases in variable input 
utilization and thus variable costs. Hence, following Nadiri and Mamuneas 
(1994), it can be said that firms will adjust their production decisions with respect 
to their own factors according to the relationship between them and public sector 
capital. This is what these authors call  the factor bias effect of public capital, 
which can be computed as the short run infrastructure elasticity of the conditional 
demand for variable inputs:  
Kg
C




The relationship between public capital and variable inputs can be of 
substitutability or complementarity, that is, public capital can be factor saving 
(
SR
XiKg ? <0), using (
SR
XiKg ? >0), or neutral (
SR
XiKg ? =0). Thus, as stated before, a 
positive shadow price would imply a net substitutive relationship between public 
capital and variable inputs. In other words, if there is an increase in the publicly 
provided input and it is substitutive (complementary) to variable inputs, the 
infrastructure increase will reduce (increase) industrial variable costs and, 
therefore, the shadow price will be positive (negative). Specifically, based on the 
variable cost function and differentiating it with respect to public capital, we 
decompose the cost saving effect provided by public capital into the effects on the 



























where it is shown how infrastructure shadow price is dependent on the value of 
the relationship between public capital and variable inputs. 
Moreover, it is commonly thought that these increases in public capital 
stocks will intensify private economic performance. The impact of infrastructures 
on the level of production can be computed as the infrastructure elasticity with 
respect to output thanks to the application of the envelope theorem, obtaining the 



















































Finally, in case of private capital not being in its long-run equilibrium level, the 
same e xact effects that have been presented for public capital can be obtained 
for the private input, since it should be considered as a quasi-fixed factor. 
Therefore, we can compute 
SR
SCKp ? , 
SR
XiKp ? and 
SR
YKp ? as well as the shadow price, 
SR
Kp S .  If the quasi-fixed factor was not in its levels of static equilibrium, its 
shadow price would be higher (lower) than the price of the services it provides, 
having a clear situation of infra-investment (supra-investment) in private capital. 
This idea can also be viewed through the ratio optimal private capital stock to 
observed private capital stock, Kp
*/Kp. If the value of the ratio is higher than 1 
then the stock of private capital in the economy is lower than the optimal. 
Regarding long run effects of public capital, they are obtained in much the 
same way as the described above for the short run. However, variations in cost   12 
and variable inputs demand caused by changes in the stock of private capital, as 
a response to variations in infrastructure endowment, must be added to the short 
run effect. This latter effect may foster the short run effect or, on the contrary, 
balance or even inverse it. In this sense, the total or long run cost elasticity to 
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(17) 
where superscript LR denotes long run. The expressions corresponding to 
Kg Kp
* ? and 
Xi Kp
* ? are necessary in order to obtain the effect of public capital in the 
long run. Since for many of the flexible functional forms used in the duality 
theory it is not possible to get a close expression for Kp















must be computed using a system of 
derivatives of implicit functions. The first derivative is obtained through the 
implicit function of equation (9) whereas the second is obtained using a system of 
implicit functions from equations (4) and (9) in which costs and private capital 
responses to variations in variable inputs are determined simultaneously. Finally, 
SR
XiKg ?  is the same short run factor bias effect. In this model, 
LR
KpKg ?  acquires 
special relevance as it summarizes the location effect of public capital 
investments. That is, it indicates the extend to which improvements in the public 
capital endowment in an economy promote private activity. Needless to say, this 
is one of the main objectives when public investments aim at spurring economic 
development, although, so far, it has been neglected by the literature analyzing 
this topic. 
Long run shadow price of infrastructures and factor bias will be evaluated   13 
in Kp
* as well, that is, these measures will include changes in variable inputs due 
to movements in private capital stock as a result of the new infrastructure 
endowment: 
M L i P  
Kg
VC
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(18) 
where: 
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XiKg ? and 
SR
XiKp ?  as in the short run, and 
LR
Kg Kp ?  as expressed above. It can be 
observed how the long run substitutive/complementary relationship may be 
decomposed into both a direct (
SR
Kg X i ? ) and an indirect effect, which results from 
the interaction between the long-run location effect of public capital (
LR
KpKg ? ) and 
the substitution/complementary relationship between variable inputs and the 
quasi-fixed factor (
SR
XiKp ? ). 
The same applies to the output elasticity to Kg in the long run, which now 
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* ?   from the implicit function of expression (9), and  XiY ?  from 
equation (7) f or both variable inputs. Analogously to the short-run case, the 
returns to scale in the long term are recovered as the inverse of 
LR
CY ? . 
Part of these long run elasticities can be obtained for private capital as 
well though the explanation i s somehow different. Thus, private capital will not 
only have a direct effect on costs in the short run, but also an indirect one 
through adjustments in variable inputs in response to private capital variations: 
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where  SCXi ? is obtained through the system of derivatives of implicit functions 
from equations (7) and (9) as stated aboved, and 
LR
Kp X i ? from equation (7) for both 
variable inputs. Referred to the latter, it is worth noting that the effect of private 
capital on the variable inputs in the long run is exactly the same one as in the 
short run, 
SR
Kp X i ? . The rest of long run effects for private capital are obtained in 
much the same way as for the public capital case. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION AND ECONOMETRIC ISSUES 
Empirical Specification 
The empirical work made in this paper in order to test the effect of public 
capital endowment on manufacturing costs is based on a translog cost function, 
a general second degree polynomial in logs, with the following form:   15 
t Kg t Kp Kg Kp t Y   + Kg Y   +
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where  t is a time trend which summarizes technological change, as in, for 
instance, Morrison and Schwartz (1996). 
This functional form permits the consideration of a great range of 
substitution possibilities while accommodating to any production technology 
without being necessary to impose a priori restrictions on returns to scale.
4 
Intermediate prices are included as a relative factor to ensure the function is 
homogeneous of degree one in factor prices. Besides, any kind of a priori returns 
to scale are imposed. For ease of notation, variables in equation (23) and 
subsequent ones do not carry any kind of subscripts referred to the observations.  
Applying Shephard’s Lemma to equation (23) we obtain the share 
equations for variable inputs on variable costs. For the two variable factors we 
consider only one equation is independent, given that factor shares sum to one. 
Thus, we have: 
  Z Z
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4 Guilkey  et al.  (1983) demonstrates the translog f orm superiority over alternate functional 
forms in Monte Carlo studies. However,  some other studies about public capital effects have 
considered other functional forms, such as a Generalized Leontief or a Generalized Cobb-
Douglas restricted cost function.  In this sense, it would be worth studying the sensitivity of 
the results to these different specifications.   16 
Therefore, the short-run equilibrium is denoted by equations (23) and (24). On 
the other hand, the long-run equilibrium condition for private capital can be 
expressed as: 
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The long-run equilibrium is represented by equations (23), (24) and (25). From 
the estimation of these equations we will obtain the main effects of public and 
private capital both in the short and long term. 
 
Econometric Issues 
For empirical implementation purposes the models have to be imbedded 
within a stochastic framework. In order to do this we consider that errors in cost 
and variable factor demands are due to errors in optimization, and the ones in 
the long run represent unanticipated information that becomes available after the 
time the investment decision is made. The models specified both in the short 
(system of equations 23 and 24) and in the long run (system of equations 23, 24 
and 25) are initially estimated using the iterative Zellner technique for 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) imposing the equality restrictions 
among parameters across the different equations. However, in order to select the 
model to be estimated, the two theoretical aspects commented in section 2 are 
going to be tested in our model: an investigation into departure of quasi-fixed 
inputs from their static equilibrium levels and whether firms are equating 
variable input demands to the optimal quantities in each time period (Shephard's 
lemma). 
First, being aware of the short run fixity of some inputs, such as private 
capital in the present case, the distinction between short and long run 
specifications must be well accounted for. With this purpose, we use the test   17 
developed by Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) to acknowledge into the possible 
divergence of quasi-fixed factors from their static equilibrium levels. Let  ?0 be 
the parameter estimates vector in the cost function alone (eq. 23),  ?1  the 
parameter vector in the demand (or share) functions for variable input function 
(eq. 24) and ?2 the parameter vector obtained from the estimation of the quasi-
fixed inputs (eq. 25). The test is constructed under the null hypothesis that the 
fixed factors are at their static equilibrium levels, so that ?2 ?  ?0. In fact, when 








appear in (23) but not in (25) under the null, then one can specify the null 
hypothesis as ?2 = 2
0 ? . This way, the estimator of the long run equilibrium model 
(let’s say  ?ˆ ) imposes the restriction implied by the test, whereas the estimator 
of the short-run equilibrium model (say  ? ~) does not impose any restriction. The 
constraint estimator  ?ˆ  is consistent under the null but not under the alternative 
hypothesis, while the unconstrained estimator  ? ~ is consistent under both, the 
null and the alternative. Schankerman and Nadiri (1986) construct a Hausman 
test, based on a comparison of the values in  ?
~testing the null that firms are in 
the long run equilibrium: 
2 1 ) ˆ ~ ( ˆ )' ˆ ~ ( q V N ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
?   (26) 
where N is the number of observations, V ˆ is the consistent estimator of V, with 
V = V 1  - V 2, being V 1 the asymptotic covariance matrix for  ? ~ and V 2 the 
asymptotic covariance matrix for  ?ˆ . The test is distributed as a chi-square with 
degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions,  q, the number of 
parameters in vector 
2
0 ? . 
Second, neoclassical production theory implies that the cost share 
equations are derived from the cost function given that firms select the amount 
of variable inputs that minimize variable costs. Parameters in (24) are, therefore,   18 
the same as those in (23). In most of the empirical works using duality theory 
these restrictions associated to the Shephard’s lemma are imposed a priori 
without being previously tested. However, if data do not fit such restrictions it 
would be a signal of the violation of some assumptions such as the cost-
minimizing behavior and the non-fixity of those factors considered as variable. 
As a result, from a statistical point of view one would be imposing values on the 
estimates which would be against the data, so that, if the parameters of the 
derived cost share equation could not be considered the same as those of the cost 
function, the computation of the effects based on the parameters would not be 
accurate. To avoid this problem, we test for the validity of the Shephard’s 
lemma in the cost function which means testing for the adequacy of the data 
with the model. In order to implement the test ?0 is again the parameter vector in 
the cost function equation, but now let 
1
0 ? be the vector of parameters from the 
cost function that appear in the variable input demand function, and  2
0 ? the rest of 
the parameters in the cost function. ?1 is still the parameter vector in the variable 
input share functions. This way, the null hypothesis would indicate that the share 
and cost equations yield the same parameters, 
1
0 ?  =  ?1. The alternative 
hypothesis is 
1
0 ?  ? ?1. In order to test the validity of the Shephard’s lemma, we 
test the appropriateness of the linear restrictions of the coefficients in a SUR 
model. 
A final econometric issue is the multicollinearity problem that may appear 
when estimating flexible functional forms. In order to avoid this problem, we 
increase the cross-section variability by descending to a regional and sectoral 
level at the same time. This way, we consider a panel data set for the 
manufacturing sectors in the Spanish regions for the period 1980-1991. This 
allows accounting for unobservable sectoral and regional differences in the 
exogenous cost level across the observations.  
   19 
4. EVIDENCE FOR THE SPANISH CASE 
Data 
For our empirical analysis we use annual data in 12 manufacturing 
sectors
5 in 15 regions of Spain (NUTS II level, without the island regions) from 
1980 t o 1991, for all the variables excepting public capital stock. Data for this 
magnitude are only measured for the aggregated regional economies, so the 
variability is confined to the regional dimension. Data have been obtained from 
two main sources. First, output, intermediates, labor costs and the number of 
workers are available for 89 manufacturing sectors which are obtained from the 
Spanish Industrial Survey (IS). Second, series of private and public capital 
stocks are taken from “El Stock de Capital en la Economía Española” (The 
Capital Stock in the Spanish Economy, FBBV, 1995) being calculated by using 
the perpetual inventory method. These series of stocks are available for all the 
Spanish regions and in the case of private capital disaggregated in 13 broad 
manufacturing sectors. Then, the 89 manufacturing sectors of the IS were 
appropriately aggregated to match with the 13 sectors for which data on stocks 
of private capital were available. However, due to the high sectoral and 
territorial disaggregation o f the data in the IS and for confidentiality reasons 
missing values are supplied for some of these sectors in some regions when it is 
necessary to comply to the statistical secret guaranteed by the survey. The 
incidence of missing data in the 13 broad manufacturing sectors at a regional 
level is only important in the sector gathering office equipment, precision and 
optics, so that we finally decided not to consider it. Thus, the twelve 
manufacturing sectors finally considered in the present study are shown in table 
1. 
                                                                 
5 In the empirical implementation, we have focus on the manufacturing sector given the 
results in several theoretical (Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 1996) and empirical (Moreno  et al., 
1997b) studies where it is obtained that public capital has a more evident economic impact on 
the manufacturing sector than in the rest.   20 
Data provided by the IS are given in nominal values, being necessary to 
use a sector-specific producer price index to deflacte them. Since the deflaction 
is initially made for 89 sectors and then we aggregate to 12 sectors, it is ensured 
that t he real input series are deflacted after considering the importance of each 
sector in each group. All variables are then used at constant 1990 prices. 
Price for employment ( PL) is obtained by dividing labor costs by the 
number of employments. The index price of intermediate inputs ( PM) is 
measured by dividing the nominal intermediate input series by the constructed 
real intermediate input series. The rental rate of private capital (PKp) is computed 
as PKp = q(r+d), where q is the private capital investment deflactor obtained from 
FBBV (1995), r is the discount rate for more than two year government bonds, 







t 1 , with It as private capital investment.
6 Private capital is 
measured by the total net capital stocks of manufacturing industry in each region. 
Public capital stock includes the net monetary stock of core infrastructures, that is, 
roads and highways, railway, harbors and maritime signaling, airports, water and 
sewage facilities, and urban structures.
7 Since public infrastructures are not 
supposed to have an immediate effect on industrial activity, the public capital 
stock variable enters the model with one period lag.  
In table 2 the evolution of the main magnitudes in the Spanish 
manufactures during the eighties is shown. Costs, both total and variable, and 
output show a net positive growth that is not equally distributed throughout the 
period. During the first half of the eighties, the average a nnual growth rate is 
negative, becoming positive and high during the second half. The same 
                                                                 
6 Following the idea given by Berndt and Hansson (1992), corporate taxes are not included in 
the private capital price measure.  For further information on factor prices for capital inputs, 
see the concept of the user cost of capital developed by Jorgenson (1963). 
7 Basic public infrastructure has been demonstrated to have a positive impact o n regional 
productivity in the Spanish regions (e.g. Mas  et al., 1996), in contrast to social public 
infrastructure whose effect is not as clear.   21 
evolution is shown by private production factors, although with a different 
intensity. Whereas labor and intermediates show a dramatic decrease during the 
first eighties, the fall in private capital is lower, probably due to the fact that 
enterprises were not able or did not consider convenient to adjust their private 
capital stock to the economic cycle. This is reinforced by the behavior in the 
expansive phase when private capital increases at lower rates than in the case of 
output. Although this would point out certain boarding and hoarding of private 
capital, which could advise some correction of private capital stocks considering 
its use, as far as we know, information on the use of capital is not available for 
our sample. However, at least part of such effects is substantial to the elasticities 
in which private capital is involved. Finally, public capital stock presents an 
important increase during the period although the cyclical behavior is observed 
by the different intensity of growth in the expansive and recessive phase.  
 
Main Results 
In order to select the appropriate model we implement the two tests 
signaled above. The value of the test proposed by Schankerman and Nadiri 
(1986) indicates a strong rejection of static equilibrium for private capital and 
thus, rejection of the assumption of long-run equilibrium (338914; p:0.000). The 
appropriate model to estimate is, therefore, the set of equations (23) and (24). 
Nevertheless, when testing the validity of the Shephard’s lemma in the cost 
function it is obtained that the restriction is rejected (76.37; p:0.000). As far as 
we know, most of the empirical works do not test the validity of this lemma 
whereas the few ones testing it have strongly rejected it (Appelbaum, 1978 for 
the USA; Doménech, 1993 for the Spanish banking sector). Thus, although in 
some papers the utilization of the restricted SUR model is justified (Morrison 
and Schwartz, 1996) because it imposes structure and robustness to the model, 
we do not consider it accurate, given the result of the test, since the estimates 
would not be consistent. Therefore, we estimate the system without imposing   22 
the restrictions, using the estimation of the parameters for the cost equation to 
obtain the optimal demand function for the variable and fixed inputs. 
The Hausman test rejecting its null hypothesis points out the estimation of 
the model including regional and sectoral fixed effects as the most accurate, 
instead of  simply pooling the data or estimating the parameters in a random 
effect model. The estimated parameters are shown in table 3. The null of joint 
non-significance of the parameters affecting public capital is strongly rejected. 
Moreover, since we are interested in assessing on the variability of the cost 
effects across manufacturing sectors and regions, we have implemented several 
F-homogeneity tests in order to get a sense of the necessity of considering 
specific sectoral and regional unobservable effects. The null hypothesis that the 
coefficients of the regional and sectoral dummies are zero is rejected, suggesting 
that the same input endowments and factor prices may cause different cost levels 
depending on the sector and region, due to the technology and efficiency in each 
one. In fact, this seems to be the case in several studies analyzing scale 
economies, market power or technological levels (Suárez, 1992 and Velázquez, 
1993 for the regions in Spain; Caballero and Lyons, 1990 for the European 
industry; Caballero and Lyons, 1992 and Burnside, 1996 for the US industry) 
where they have obtained great differences across industries and regions. Given 
these findings, it could seem relevant to obtain the individual estimation of the 
cost function for each sector (considering regional and time variability) and for 
each region (considering sectoral and time variability). Nevertheless, in doing 
so, we would probably face the problem of a certain degree of multicollinearity 
that functions considering cross-products of  the variables encounter. For this 
reason, we rather prefer estimating the functions with the whole panel data set in 
order to increase variability while controlling for regional and sectoral 
differences through the consideration of different levels in the  intercept term. 
This way, the estimates obtained will be reliable, and still we can obtain specific 
elasticities for public capital and scale economies for each region and sector,   23 
offering interesting conclusions for the orientation of policy making referred to 
public capital investments. 
Based on the resulting estimated parameters, the effects mentioned in 
section 2 about public and private capital impact on economic performance are 
measured by calculating the required derivatives. Even though all the indicators 
below have been measured for each region and sector in every year, we only 
present some general averages. Concretely, we present four of them: regional, 
sectoral, temporal and global. They have been obtained by weighting the 
elasticity of each observation by the rate that the output in this specific 
observation represents over the global output in the region, sector, or time period 
respectively. 
 
Short run effects 
The cost elasticity with respect to public capital in the short run, 
SR
SCKg ? , 
(table 4) has a positive average (0.027) indicating that when public capital stock 
increases 1%, private production cost increases 0.027%. This indicates that, in 
general terms, manufactures did not benefit from a reduction in costs with the 
increases of public capital stocks during the eighties in all the Spanish regions. 
The variability of the elasticity is very small across regions and higher across 
sectors. Figure 1 represents a three-dimensional plot that synthesizes the 
response in costs when t he values of public and private capital stocks change 
within the range of the variables in the sample and according to the parameters 
obtained in the estimation of the cost function. It is shown how increases in 
public capital stock lead to variable cost r eductions when the levels of public 
and private stock are not high. However, once a certain endowment threshold is 
gained, ulterior increases in the stock of public capital end up augmenting costs 
proportional to the existing stock of private capital. According to the figure and 
the results in table 4, it can be concluded that all regions and manufacturing 
sectors in Spain had reached this threshold level during the eighties.    24 
The measures of the implicit willingness of private sector to pay for 
infrastructures according to the values of the elasticity 
SR
SCKg ?  follow the same 
pattern, with a negative price average. This negative sign for infrastructures 
shadow price in the short term implies a net complementary relationship 
between public capital and variable inputs. This can be observed analyzing the 
type of relationship between public capital and each variable factor, in other 
words, obtaining the infrastructure elasticity of the conditional demand for labor 
and intermediates. On average, from the results it can be concluded that 
infrastructure capital is labor saving and intermediate using for all regions and 
sectors throughout the period. Indeed, there has been a general conclusion in the 
literature in favor of a substitutability relationship between labor and public 
capital (Berdnt and Hanson, 1992; Nadiri and Mamuneas, 1994; Seitz and Licht, 
1995) indicating that public infrastructure investment allows firms to produce 
the same output with lower labor costs. However, two aspects are worth pointing 
out. First, the elasticities for labor are bigger than for intermediates indicating 
that public capital effect reducing labor can be of a certain importance (with a 
global average of  -0.157) while the effect on intermediates is relatively low 
(0.06). Second, the variability across sectors, regions and time periods for 
intermediate elasticity is really low. 
All these results concerning infrastructures have equally been obtained for 
private capital. In general terms, it can be said that although there is also a 
significant difference across regions and sectors, the average of the estimated 
elasticity of production cost with respect to private capital stock is 0.039. 
However, there is a cost reducing effect associated with the supply of private 
capital in the cases of Murcia, La Rioja and Extremadura. As a consequence, 
except for these three cases, private capital shadow price is negative, which can 
be disentangled in a substitution relation with intermediates (average elasticity 
of  -0.097) and a complementary relationship between private capital and labor 
(average elasticity of 0.253).    25 
 
Long-run effects 
As it has been signaled in section 2, public capital may influence private 
costs and input demands in the long term through changes in private capital, 
which is considered to be fixed in the short term. According to the results in 
table 5, the elasticity of costs with respect to public capital in the long run 
continues being positive, with a slightly higher magnitude than in the short run 
(although it is higher in some cases and lower in others) and with an important 
sectoral differentiation.
8 It is also worth noting that this elasticity has moved 
conversely to the business cycle. 
  If we disentangle this general long-run effect, the location effect of public 
capital turns out to be negative that is, increases in public infrastructure have led 
to global private capital reductions, with an average elasticity of  –0.130 in the 
short run and  -0.167 in the long run (table 6). This result indicates that 
infrastructure investments have not been able to promote private investment 
along the analyzed period but the opposite. And this decline in private capital 
leads to general cost reductions so that part of the short run effect of 
infrastructure on costs is reversed. As a whole, this makes 
LR
CKg ? very similar 
to
SR
SCKg ? . It is worth noting that most part of the location effect is obtained in the 
short run, with a very small regional variation. Nevertheless, at a sectoral level, 
the sectors of Food, drinks and tobacco, Transport material, Metallic products 
and metalwork, Non-metallic minerals and products, and Chemistry present an 
extreme value. The most favorable situation for the location effect would have 
been when public capital would  have attracted private investment and thus 
translated into cost reductions. However, the present negative relationship may 
                                                                 
8 Sector 8, which is Food, drinks and tobacco, presents extreme results for some of the 
elasticities.  As a consequence, and in order to check this is not affecting the general results, 
the same estimation has been done without considering the data for this sector.  However, 
since the set of effects changed only slightly, we consider preferable to present the results 
including this sector.   26 
be a consequence of the restructuring process in some sectors in specific regions 
in the analyzed period, together with continued increments of public capital 
endowments in these regions, as shown by private and public capital evolution 
in table 2. Besides, for other sectors and regions, the effects of the business 
cycle could explain this negative relationship. On the other hand, this  result 
could be understood, at least in part, as evidence of a crowding-out effect so 
government financial requirements could detract private investment according to 
the traditional argument. 
Also, in the long term, the global average cost elasticity with respect to 
private capital (table 5) has turned into a negative value, –0.025, being negative 
in all sectors and regions. Firms are therefore willing to pay for a higher 
investment in private capital, as shown by an average shadow price of 0.03. We 
reach a  similar conclusion when analyzing the ratio optimal and real private 
capital. The average value for this ratio is 2.026, indicating that firms are below 
the optimal level of private capital. Analyzing the temporal evolution of this 
ratio, although it begins with a value of 2.17, a reduction is produced in the mid-
eighties, and increases again at the end of the decade. It seems, therefore, that 
the evolution of the ratio, with values over the unity, has experienced a similar 
evolution to the business cycle.  
Finally, as regards the output effects, it must be pointed out that the 
returns to scale are slightly increasing for the Spanish manufactures, with an 
average value of 1.13 in the short run, increasing in the long term till 1.20. 
However, there is large variability especially across sectors, which is in line with 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
In the present paper we have theoretically derived the long run effects of 
public infrastructure on cost and production performance from a dual approach. 
Previous works aiming at analyzing those effects have just considered short run 
responses through adjustments in variable inputs. On the contrary, herein we 
have allowed infrastructure endowment to interact with private capital, which 
has been supposed to be a quasi-fixed input. The motivation has been the belief 
that infrastructures may alter the performance of an economy not only through 
effects on variable inputs (short run) but also through a location effect, by which 
it may modify the total amount of private capital in the economy. Furthermore, 
the effects of private capital have also been derived for the short and long run. It 
allows us to compare the contribution to cost saving of both types of capital. 
Applied to the Spanish regional manufactures, the present paper has 
estimated a cost function in a translog form, rejecting the accuracy of the 
Shephard´s lemma as well as the existence of long run equilibrium for private 
capital based on the results of several statistics. The dual approach leads us to 
conclude that, in average, the relationship between infrastructure and cost 
variations is positive, both in the short and long run. However, a threshold level 
in the existing public capital stock is observed, so that for low levels of public 
capital improvements in such stock are translated into cost reductions, whereas 
once this threshold level is surpassed, ulterior investments cause manufacturing 
activity to be more costly. Both, the results and the observation of the existing 
stocks along the period, reveal that this threshold was obtained for most Spanish 
regions at the beginning of the eighties. Finally, according to the elasticities 
referred to the location effect of public capital, the r esults show that the 
investments in infrastructures during this decade in Spain were not able, in 
general terms, to enhance private investment. This indirect effect of public 
capital, neglected when applying the approach traditionally used so far, is one of 
the most meaningful when assessing policies aiming at promoting development   28 
in less favored regions. Among the different explanations for its value in our 
case, one may think of the coincidence between continued increases in public 
capital going along with reductions in private capital in some regions and 
sectors, the traditional crowding-out effect, and the fact that some infrastructure 
investments, such as transports and communications, could exacerbate 
agglomeration economies hurting the less-developed regions. 
Further, regional and specially sectoral variability of the effects is far 
from being negligible. As a consequence, conclusions on the effects of 
infrastructure investments based on aggregate results may be misleading. These 
differences in sectoral responses would support the sectoral restructuring 
advocated by some theoretical models on the impact of publicly provided inputs 
of production.   29 
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 Table 1. Description of the manufacturing groupings 
S1  Metallic minerals and first transformation of metals  
S2  Non metallic minerals and products  
S3  Chemistry  
S4  Metallic products and metalwork  
S5  Agricultural and industrial machinery and equipment  
S6  Electric machinery and material  
S7  Transport material  
S8  Food products, alcohol, drinks and tobacco  
S9  Textiles, leather and shoes  
S10  Paper and derivatives and printing  
S11  Rubber and plastic derivatives  







Table 2.  Evolution of the main magnitudes for manufactures (Spain, 1980-1991) 
  SC  VC  Y  L  M  Kp  Kg 
1980  17642725  16728047  19631286  2230329  24940231  11038002  6959795 
1981  17165044  16161906  18883656  2078208  21287213  10934479  7033186 
1982  16412582  15385034  18034353  1940444  17998205  10792445  7158079 
1983  17061297  15710503  18478547  1888674  16535701  10589600  7428800 
1984  16774517  15383552  18064788  1793935  14636095  10400768  7705198 
1985  16737355  15417679  18247481  1702248  13718291  10289424  7932187 
1986  16776266  15664091  18789110  1685525  13441986  10221182  8216566 
1987  18473829  16835434  20312746  1683256  14313403  10265005  8532317 
1988  20171572  18577380  22302117  1712042  15472698  10389349  8878993 
1989  21635853  19998629  23881279  1753598  15934209  10625602  9320821 
1990  22647357  20846814  24740422  1777382  16216936  10902753  9928209 
1991  23242546  21527560  25441617  1761201  16391786  11334278  10746074 
AAGR 80-91  2.32%  2.12%  2.18%  -1.95%  -3.44%  0.22%  3.69% 
AAGR 80-85  -0.87%  -1.35%  -1.21%  -4.40%  -9.48%  -1.16%  2.20% 
AAGR 86-91  5.58%  5.44%  5.18%  0.73%  3.36%  1.74%  4.57% 
NOTE: AAGR is the average annual growth rate. All variables but labor are given in million of 1990 pesetas. Labor represents the 
number of workers.    32 
 Table 3.  Estimation of the cost function  
Coefficient  Estimate  t-Student    Coefficient  Estimate  t-Student 
?0  0.903  0.29    ?LY  -0.027  -1.98 
?L  0.463  3.67    ?LKp  0.069  4.74 
?Y  1.188  17.26    ?LKg  -0.043  -3.63 
?Kp  -0.314  -4.68    ?LT  -0.010  -4.18 
?Kg  -0.061  -0.11    ?Ykp  -0.0257  -3.12 
?t  -0.098  -3.68    ?Ykg  -0.017  -2.63 
?LL  0.003  0.09    ?YT  -0.001  -0.43 
?YY  0.026  3.05    ?KpKg  0.020  3.36 
?KpKp  0.027  3.31    ?KpT  0.002  2.02 
?KgKg  0.009  0.20    ?KgT  -0.001  -0.66 
?TT  0.008  17.95         
R






NOTES:  The regression includes sectoral and regional fixed effects whose coefficients are not supplied to save 
space. Total number of observations: 2160.  F1:  Global significance test for public capital parameters; F 2: 
Significance test for regional and sectoral dummies; F3: Significance test for regional dummies; F4: Significance test 






Figure 1.  Behavior of costs in Spanish manufactures   33 
Table 4.  Public and private capital effects in the short run  
  ?SCKg  SKg  ?LKg  ?MKg  ?SCKp  SKp  ?LKp  ?MKp 
                 
GLOBAL AVERAGE 
  0.027  -0.011  -0.157  0.060  0.039  -0.041  0.253  -0.097 
                 
REGIONAL AVERAGE 
AND  0.037  -0.012  -0.162  0.059  0.050  -0.052  0.262  -0.096 
ARA  0.021  -0.005  -0.171  0.058  0.031  -0.036  0.277  -0.093 
AST  0.024  -0.012  -0.145  0.064  0.034  -0.032  0.235  -0.104 
CANT  0.014  -0.007  -0.138  0.064  0.010  -0.010  0.223  -0.103 
C-L  0.021  -0.007  -0.171  0.058  0.042  -0.048  0.277  -0.093 
C-M  0.031  -0.007  -0.176  0.058  0.014  -0.013  0.284  -0.093 
CAT  0.031  -0.015  -0.150  0.061  0.049  -0.053  0.242  -0.098 
VAL  0.033  -0.010  -0.160  0.059  0.031  -0.031  0.259  -0.095 
EXT  0.034  -0.006  -0.189  0.058  -0.002  0.002  0.306  -0.093 
GAL  0.029  -0.009  -0.170  0.058  0.016  -0.016  0.274  -0.094 
MAD  0.015  -0.006  -0.154  0.060  0.044  -0.050  0.248  -0.097 
MUR  0.025  -0.009  -0.176  0.059  -0.015  0.012  0.284  -0.095 
NAV  0.010  -0.003  -0.160  0.059  0.014  -0.014  0.258  -0.095 
PV  0.027  -0.011  -0.141  0.063  0.055  -0.057  0.227  -0.102 
RIO  0.013  -0.004  -0.176  0.058  -0.008  0.007  0.284  -0.093 
                 
SECTORAL AVERAGE 
S1  0.040  -0.018  -0.172  0.087  0.056  -0.050  0.278  -0.140 
S2  0.032  -0.005  -0.164  0.066  0.041  -0.045  0.264  -0.106 
S3  0.033  -0.011  -0.169  0.071  0.048  -0.054  0.273  -0.114 
S4  0.030  -0.008  -0.203  0.073  0.029  -0.031  0.327  -0.118 
S5  0.004  -0.001  -0.116  0.030  0.018  -0.025  0.188  -0.049 
S6  0.007  -0.002  -0.151  0.038  0.021  -0.024  0.243  -0.061 
S7  0.024  -0.011  -0.274  0.097  0.061  -0.080  0.442  -0.157 
S8  0.115  -0.060  -0.664  0.261  0.025  -0.024  1.072  -0.422 
S9  0.032  -0.010  -0.183  0.059  0.005  -0.005  0.295  -0.095 
S10  0.014  -0.003  -0.117  0.040  0.029  -0.032  0.189  -0.065 
S11  0.008  -0.001  -0.091  0.029  0.022  -0.024  0.147  -0.048 
S12  0.024  -0.003  -0.137  0.042  0.007  -0.007  0.221  -0.068 
               
TEMPORAL AVERAGE 
1980  0.019  -0.008  -0.123  0.066  0.050  -0.045  0.199  -0.106 
1981  0.023  -0.009  -0.127  0.065  0.046  -0.043  0.205  -0.105 
1982  0.026  -0.010  -0.131  0.064  0.042  -0.038  0.212  -0.103 
1983  0.029  -0.012  -0.137  0.063  0.036  -0.039  0.221  -0.101 
1984  0.033  -0.013  -0.142  0.061  0.030  -0.032  0.230  -0.099 
1985  0.035  -0.013  -0.148  0.060  0.028  -0.028  0.239  -0.098 
1986  0.032  -0.012  -0.156  0.059  0.032  -0.027  0.252  -0.096 
1987  0.028  -0.011  -0.164  0.058  0.034  -0.042  0.265  -0.094 
1988  0.026  -0.011  -0.174  0.057  0.035  -0.042  0.281  -0.092 
1989  0.024  -0.010  -0.183  0.056  0.038  -0.045  0.296  -0.091 
1990  0.022  -0.009  -0.193  0.055  0.044  -0.056  0.312  -0.089 
1991  0.021  -0.008  -0.204  0.055  0.050  -0.059  0.329  -0.088 
The Spanish regions included in the analysis are: Andalucía (AND), Aragón (ARA), Asturias (AST), Cantabria (CANT), 
Castilla-León (C-L), Castilla-la-Mancha (C-M), Cataluña (CAT), Valencia (VAL), Extremadura (EXT), Galicia (GAL), 
Madrid (MAD), Murcia (MUR), Navarra (NAV), País Vasco (PV), La Rioja (RIO). Codes for sectors as described in table 1.   34 
 
Table 5.  Public and private capital effects in the long run 
  ?CKg  SKg  ?LKg  ?MKg  ?CKp  SKp  Kp
*/Kp 
               
GLOBAL AVERAGE 
  0.029  -0.008  -0.179  0.080  -0.025  0.031  2.026 
               
REGIONAL AVERAGE 
AND  0.034  -0.009  -0.196  0.079  -0.012  0.017  1.684 
ARA  0.025  -0.004  -0.196  0.078  -0.034  0.043  1.979 
AST  0.022  -0.009  -0.173  0.082  -0.028  0.024  1.554 
CANT  0.018  -0.006  -0.162  0.081  -0.050  0.045  1.775 
C-L  0.025  -0.004  -0.195  0.079  -0.025  0.035  2.295 
C-M  0.038  -0.006  -0.197  0.077  -0.041  0.039  2.205 
CAT  0.033  -0.011  -0.168  0.081  -0.014  0.022  2.113 
VAL  0.038  -0.008  -0.178  0.079  -0.030  0.035  2.144 
EXT  0.041  -0.006  -0.225  0.076  -0.053  0.047  1.866 
GAL  0.039  -0.008  -0.184  0.078  -0.040  0.041  2.589 
MAD  0.018  -0.003  -0.173  0.081  -0.027  0.038  2.066 
MUR  0.040  -0.009  -0.178  0.078  -0.066  0.055  2.736 
NAV  0.020  -0.002  -0.175  0.079  -0.049  0.052  2.435 
PV  0.021  -0.007  -0.172  0.081  -0.012  0.014  1.328 
RIO  0.028  -0.004  -0.188  0.078  -0.068  0.065  2.764 
               
SECTORAL AVERAGE 
S1  0.034  -0.013  -0.212  0.109  -0.020  0.015  1.843 
S2  0.025  -0.004  -0.213  0.085  -0.033  0.035  1.134 
S3  0.026  -0.008  -0.215  0.091  -0.017  0.021  1.342 
S4  0.035  -0.006  -0.233  0.097  -0.049  0.057  2.202 
S5  0.006  -0.000  -0.135  0.043  -0.023  0.034  1.123 
S6  0.011  -0.001  -0.158  0.051  -0.023  0.031  1.416 
S7  0.033  -0.006  -0.306  0.131  -0.046  0.068  3.754 
S8  0.181  -0.057  -0.676  0.349  -0.222  0.238  12.87 
S9  0.045  -0.010  -0.195  0.079  -0.051  0.052  2.647 
S10  0.012  -0.002  -0.147  0.054  -0.017  0.020  0.991 
S11  0.007  -0.000  -0.114  0.040  -0.013  0.016  0.763 
S12  0.029  -0.003  -0.155  0.057  -0.036  0.038  1.442 
               
TEMPORAL AVERAGE 
1980  0.022  -0.004  -0.144  0.090  -0.063  0.065  2.170 
1981  0.025  -0.006  -0.148  0.087  -0.050  0.053  2.047 
1982  0.029  -0.008  -0.151  0.085  -0.040  0.041  2.064 
1983  0.031  -0.009  -0.160  0.082  -0.034  0.041  1.786 
1984  0.036  -0.011  -0.164  0.080  -0.028  0.034  1.808 
1985  0.039  -0.011  -0.168  0.079  -0.024  0.027  1.941 
1986  0.039  -0.010  -0.171  0.079  -0.019  0.020  2.336 
1987  0.030  -0.009  -0.190  0.076  -0.016  0.023  1.811 
1988  0.030  -0.008  -0.195  0.076  -0.013  0.019  2.071 
1989  0.028  -0.008  -0.204  0.075  -0.008  0.014  2.165 
1990  0.024  -0.006  -0.219  0.074  -0.003  0.007  1.994 
1991  0.022  -0.004  -0.229  0.074  0.003  0.001  2.124 
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Table 6.  Location effect of public capital    
  LR
KpKg ?   SR
KpKg ?   KpL ?   KpM ?  
         
GLOBAL AVERAGE 
  -0.167  -0.130  0.697  0.897 
         
REGIONAL AVERAGE 
AND  -0.178  -0.134  0.684  0.888 
ARA  -0.178  -0.133  0.687  0.892 
AST  -0.160  -0.127  0.706  0.910 
CANT  -0.148  -0.117  0.719  0.927 
C-L  -0.181  -0.138  0.682  0.881 
C-M  -0.166  -0.121  0.700  0.915 
CAT  -0.162  -0.131  0.700  0.896 
VAL  -0.161  -0.124  0.701  0.905 
EXT  -0.170  -0.115  0.696  0.926 
GAL  -0.160  -0.121  0.706  0.916 
MAD  -0.169  -0.136  0.693  0.886 
MUR  -0.143  -0.108  0.724  0.941 
NAV  -0.162  -0.126  0.704  0.906 
PV  -0.170  -0.136  0.695  0.892 
RIO  -0.158  -0.116  0.702  0.913 
         
SECTORAL AVERAGE 
S1  -0.206  -0.169  0.928  1.190 
S2  -0.198  -0.144  0.747  0.976 
S3  -0.198  -0.148  0.790  1.026 
S4  -0.208  -0.155  0.861  1.119 
S5  -0.116  -0.082  0.363  0.478 
S6  -0.126  -0.091  0.447  0.584 
S7  -0.284  -0.220  1.153  1.487 
S8  -0.600  -0.489  3.165  4.060 
S9  -0.163  -0.119  0.725  0.945 
S10  -0.135  -0.098  0.466  0.609 
S11  -0.105  -0.077  0.337  0.440 
S12  -0.130  -0.091  0.518  0.681 
         
TEMPORAL AVERAGE 
1980  -0.177  -0.164  0.680  0.848 
1981  -0.170  -0.153  0.691  0.866 
1982  -0.164  -0.144  0.698  0.881 
1983  -0.160  -0.133  0.704  0.897 
1984  -0.156  -0.125  0.708  0.908 
1985  -0.155  -0.121  0.709  0.912 
1986  -0.157  -0.123  0.706  0.907 
1987  -0.165  -0.119  0.701  0.913 
1988  -0.166  -0.119  0.700  0.914 
1989  -0.169  -0.118  0.695  0.912 
1990  -0.177  -0.119  0.687  0.909 
1991  -0.182  -0.121  0.680  0.902 
 
 
  